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 The Harvard and Chicago Schools and the Dominant Firm 
 
 Herbert Hovenkamp1 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The Chicago School has produced many significant contributions to the 
antitrust literature of the last half century.  Thanks in part to Chicago 
School efforts today we have an antitrust policy that is more rigorously 
economic, less concerned with protecting noneconomic values that are 
impossible to identify and weigh, and more confident that markets will 
correct themselves without government intervention.   This Chicago 
School revolution came at the expense of the Harvard "structural" school, 
which flourished from the 1930s through the 1950s.  That school rested 
on a fairly rigid theory of Cournot oligopoly, exaggerated notions about 
barriers and impediments to entry, and a belief that certain types of 
anticompetitive conduct were more-or-less inevitable given a particular 
market structure. However, the chastised Harvard School that emerged in 
the late 1970s in the writings of Phillip E. Areeda and a converted Donald 
F. Turner were much less ambitious about the goals of antitrust, more 
concerned with conduct as such, and significantly more skeptical about 
the benefits of aggressive judicial intervention.  
 
 This story of a victorious Chicago School and a humbled and 
disciplined Harvard School is incomplete, however.  The antitrust case 
law reveals something quite different.  On most of the important issues 
this chastised Harvard School has captured antitrust decision making in 
the courts, and largely in the enforcement agencies. This paper explores 
these differences, focusing mainly on dominant firm practices. 
 
 
 Introduction: 
 The Harvard and Chicago Schools 
 
 The Chicago School has produced many significant contributions to 
the antitrust literature of the last half century.  Thanks in part to Chicago 
School efforts today we have an antitrust policy that is more rigorously 
economic, less concerned with protecting noneconomic values that are 
impossible to identify and weigh, and more confident that markets will correct 
themselves without government intervention.2  This Chicago School 
                                            
1.  Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, Univ. of Iowa. 
2.  A few of the more important writings include Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law 
(1976; 2d ed. 2001); Frank H. Easterbrook, Ignorance and Antitrust 119, in 
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revolution came at the expense of the Harvard "structural" school, which 
flourished from the 1930s through the 1950s.  That school rested on a fairly 
rigid theory of Cournot oligopoly, exaggerated notions about barriers and 
impediments to entry, and a belief that certain types of anticompetitive 
conduct were more-or-less inevitable given a particular market structure.3  As 
a result, the best course for antitrust was to go after the structure and the 
conduct would take care of itself.  The chastised Harvard School that 
emerged in the late 1970s in the writings of Phillip E. Areeda and a converted 
Donald F. Turner were much less ambitious about the goals of antitrust, 
much more concerned with conduct as such, and significantly more skeptical 
about the benefits of aggressive judicial intervention.4 
 
 This story of a victorious Chicago School and a humbled and 
disciplined Harvard School is incomplete, however.  The antitrust case law 
reveals something quite different.  On most of the important issues this 
chastised Harvard School has captured antitrust decision making in the 
courts, and largely in the enforcement agencies.5  For example, the Chicago 
position on predatory pricing is largely that predatory pricing is an irrational 
activity and those claiming it should be summarily dismissed.6  Somewhat 
                                                                                                                                           
Antitrust, Innovation, and Competitiveness (T. Jorde & D. Teece, eds., 1992); 
Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Texas L. Rev. 1, 2 (1984); 
Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U.Pa.L.Rev. 
925 (1979); Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: a Policy at War with Itself 
(1978). 
3.  On the Harvard School, see Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: 
Principle and Execution 35-38 (2006).  See also Herbert Hovenkamp, United 
States Competition Policy in Crisis: 1890-1955, 94 Minn. L.Rev. 311 (2009), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1156927;James W. 
Meehan, Jr. and Robert J. Larner, "The Structural School, Its Critics, and its 
Progeny: An Assessment," in Economics and Antitrust Policy (Robert J. Larner 
& James W. Meehan, Jr., eds. 1989), at 182. 
4.  See Hovenkamp, Antitrust Enterprise, note __ at 37; Herbert Hovenkamp, 
The Rationalization of Antitrust, 116 Harv.L.Rev. 917 (2003). 
5.  See also William Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition 
Law for Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 
Col.Bus.L.Rev. 1 (2007); and see William H. Page, Areeda, Chicago, and 
Antitrust Injury:  Economic Efficiency and Legal Process, 41 Antitrust Bull. 909 
(1996). 
6.  E.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 
Univ.Chi.L.Rev. 263 (1981).  Only a little less strident is Bork, Antitrust Paradox, 
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more moderate Chicago School members, such as then Professor Richard A. 
Posner, argued that the test should be pricing below long run marginal cost 
with intent to harm a rival.7  By contrast, the Harvard literature, beginning with 
Areeda's and Turner's article in 1975, argued that the law of predatory pricing 
consists of two elements: first, proof that prices were below a given measure 
of cost, namely short run marginal cost or average variable cost; and second, 
that at the time of the predation decision the defendant faced a sufficient 
prospect of recoupment.8  In its important Brooke Group decision the 
Supreme Court cited Chicago School as well as Harvard School 
scholarship,9 but the test for predation that they adopted was completely 
taken from a page of the Harvard School: in order to show unlawful predatory 
pricing a plaintiff had to show recoupment plus prices lower than some 
measure of cost.10  The Supreme Court's 2007 Weyerhaeuser decision 
                                                                                                                                           
note __ 144-155. 
7.  See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law 189 (1976); and in the second edition, 
p. 215 (repeating the suggestion, but with qualifications).  For critiques, see 3 
Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &741e2 (2d ed. 2002); 
Oliver E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 
Yale L.J. 284, 322 n.88 (1977).  But see Richard Posner, The Chicago School 
of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 925, 941 (1979) (somewhat 
ambiguously modifying earlier position).  Most recently, Posner has modified his 
position much more significantly, perhaps moving left of the Areeda-Turner test. 
 See Antitrust Law (2d ed. 2001) at 217-223 (describing Areeda-Turner test as 
"toothless"); but id. at 215 (seeing value in a marginal cost test). 
8.  Phillip E. Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related 
Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv.L.Rev. 697, 698 (1975): 
 
 "... the classically-feared case of predation has been the deliberate 
sacrifice of present revenues for the purpose of driving rivals out of the 
market and then recouping the losses through higher profits earned in 
the absence of competition.") 
 
See also the first edition of the Antitrust Law treatise: 3 Phillip E. Areeda & 
Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Law &711b at 151 (1978) (similar); and see 3 
Antitrust Law, Ch. 7C-2 (structural issues and recoupment); 7C-3 (price-cost 
relationships). 
9.  See Brooke Group, note __, 509 U.S. at 233 (citing Bork, Paradox, note __); 
id. at 224 (citing Posner, Antitrust Law, note __); id. at 233 (citing Easterbrook, 
Limits of Antitrust, note __). 
10.  Passim (citing Antitrust Law 13 times). 
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reiterated these requirements.11 
 
 Perhaps a lingering difference between the Chicago and Harvard 
approaches to predatory pricing lies in the Chicago preference to consider 
"recoupment" first and the Harvard preference to look at price-cost 
relationships.  But the fact is that under the Harvard approach both are 
essential to a predatory pricing claim.  Further, which one is more 
"fundamental," or best examined first, is heavily driven by facts.  In cases of 
easy entry or numerous rivals who can expand output lack of recoupment is 
easy to measure and should lead to a quick dismissal.12  But other cases, 
including Brooke Group itself, require fairly strong assumptions about 
oligopoly behavior in order to assess the likelihood of recoupment.  That 
case refused to condemn prices significantly below cost in a market 
(cigarettes) with no recent entry and a long history of lockstep oligopoly 
pricing, after observing that even a relatively well disciplined oligopoly has 
occasional relapses. 
 
 The same thing is true about price-cost relations.  In some cases 
measuring them is extraordinarily difficult, particularly if the defendant 
produces multiple products with common costs.  In other cases measurement 
is easy, as when prices are clearly above any measure of cost, or when they 
are below even the direct cost of inputs.  In sum, whether recoupment or 
price-cost relationships is the "bedrock" doctrine in a predatory pricing case 
depends entirely on the circumstances.  
 
 The same thing has largely been true in unilateral refusal to deal 
cases, where the Chicago School generally argued for per se legality and the 
Harvard School took a more nuanced approach looking at the nature of the 
facility or input for which dealing is claimed and the impact of the refusal on 
competition.  In its Aspen decision the Supreme Court adopted a standard for 
unilateral refusals to deal that was more hostile than either the Chicago or 
Harvard Schools advocated.13  In Trinko, however, the Supreme Court 
completely ignored the Chicago School literature but relied numerous times 
                                            
11.  Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc, 127 S.Ct. 
1069 (2007). 
12.  E.g., A.A. Poultry Farms v. Rose Acre Farms, 881 F.2d 1396, 1401 (7th 
Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1019 (1990) (looking first at recoupment in 
competitively structured market with low entry barriers). 
13.  Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985); 
see 3A Antitrust Law &772 (2d ed. 2002). 
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on Harvard School literature in placing stringent limitations on refusal to deal 
doctrine.14 
 
 In antitrust policy toward vertical restraints, the strong Chicago 
position was that they should be lawful per se.15  Today it seems fairly clear 
that these stronger views jumped too quickly from the Chicago theory that 
free riding was an important explanation for vertical restraints16 to the 
conclusion that it was virtually the only explanation.  The Harvard position 
has been more nuanced, finding sustantial risk that powerful dealers could 
use RPM to create a price umbrella for themselves.17  In 1997 in State Oil the 
Supreme Court adopted the rule of reason rather than per se legality for 
maximum RPM, and in Leegin Creative Products in 2007 a divided Supreme 
Court overruled the nearly century old Dr. Miles decision and did the same 
thing for minimum RPM.18  No one advocated the Chicago School “per se 
legal” position.  Justice Kennedy, speaking for the majority, applied a rule of 
                                            
14.  Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 
U.S. 398, 411, 415 (2004).  See also Spencer Weber Waller, Microsoft and 
Trinko: A Tale of Two Courts, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 901, 915-16 (emphasizing 
role of Harvard School in Trinko decision); Kovacic, Intellectual DNA, note ___ 
(arguing, inter alia, that then Judge Breyer's distinctly Harvard School approach 
in Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990), is the 
guiding force behind Trinko). 
15.  Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted 
Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U.Chi.L.Rev. 6, 9 (1981); Robert H Bork, The 
Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division (part 
2), 75 Yale L.J. 373 (1966); Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and 
the Rule of Reason, 53 Antitrust L.J. 135 (1984) (recognizing only vertical 
arrangements used to facilitate horizontal collusion as worthy of condemnation). 
16.  E.g., Lester Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade? 3 J.L. & 
Econ. 86 (1960); Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: 
Price Fixing and Market Division (part 2), 75 Yale L.J. 373 (1966); Richard A. 
Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on The 
Sylvania Decision, 45 U.Chi.L.Rev. 1 (1977). 
17.  See 8 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp &1604 (2d ed. 2004). 
18.  State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997); Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. 
v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705 (2007), overruling Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John 
D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).  See 8 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &1620 (2d ed. 2004). 
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reason but recognized that RPM could impose competitive harm.  Justice 
Breyer, speaking for four dissenters believed it was too late in the day to 
abandon the per se rule. 
  
 In tying and exclusive dealing law the scope of liability has narrowed 
considerably over the last twenty years.  The Chicago School became 
famous for its critique of tying law exploding the "leverage" theory and finding 
little basis for condemning either tying or exclusive dealing.19  The Harvard 
School has been more reserved, seeing potential for harm if the market 
structure is monopolistic or conducive to monopoly.20  One completely 
justified development, driven entirely by Harvard School ideology, is the 
increased use of '2 of the Sherman Act for exclusionary contracting, 
sanctioned in both Microsoft and Dentsply.21  Antitcompetitive tying and 
exclusive dealing are always best analyzed as "unilateral" practices, because 
the downstream party is either unwilling or else is agreeing to exclusivity only 
in exchange for something else.22  Further, the market share requirements for 
anticompetitive exclusive dealing or tying are generally significant and make 
the practices more suitable for evaluation under '2.  Recent case law in tying 
and exclusive dealing has been driven mainly by Harvard approaches.23 
                                            
19.  E.g., Bork, Antitrust Paradox, note __ at 299-309 (exclusive dealing); 365-
381 (tying). 
20.  See 9 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law && 1704, 
1705, 1709, 1710 (2d ed. 2004) 
21.  See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 66-67 (D.C. Cir. 2001), 
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001) (condemning Microsoft's "commingling" of 
platform and browser code under '2 as a form of tying); United States v. 
Dentsply Int'l., Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 191 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 
1023 (2006) (condemning exclusive dealing under '2). 
22.  Of course many procompetitive uses of tying and exclusive dealing are 
bilateral, in that both parties stand to gain from the exclusivity itself.  See, e.g., 
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2. 6 & n. 3 (1984), in which 
the defendant hospital and the Roux firm with which it had an exclusive dealing 
contract promised exclusivity to each other. 
23.  E.g., Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) 
(abolishing presumption of market power for patented tying products and calling 
per se rule into question); Jefferson Parish, note __ (refusing to reject per se 
rule but imposing serious market power requirement); Dentsply (condemning 
exclusive dealing by dominant firm under '2; citing only Antitrust Law treatise); 
Microsoft, note __ (condemning "commingling" of platform and browser code 
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 In sum, notwithstanding Chicago School efforts to write "foreclosure" 
out of the list of worthwhile antitrust concerns, the case law continues to 
recognize a concept of market foreclosure that has been a mainstay of 
Harvard School antitrust policy since Joe Bain's writings on entry barriers in 
the 1950s, although it has been considerably disciplined in subsequent 
years. 
 
 On remedies, at least some members of the Chicago School have 
advocated severe limitations on antitrust enforcement, including the virtual 
elimination of competitor suits,24 and significant changes in the way that 
antitrust measures damages, including measuring of damages in accordance 
with optimal deterrence rather than plaintiffs' losses, and the at least selective 
abolition of treble damages.25  By contrast, the Harvard position has tried to 
develop a more coherent and economically defensible model for private 
remedies that preserves more of the traditional doctrine and is more faithful 
to the statutory language.  Thus the Harvard School developed the concept 
of "antitrust injury" to ensure that the rationale for private remedies 
corresponds with the rationale for applying the antitrust laws in the first 
place.26  Along with this it developed much more severe rules for plaintiff 
standing.  By and large the courts have followed the Harvard School 
approach, refusing to abolish competitor lawsuits but placing more stringent 
limitations on them. 
 
 One significant place where the Supreme Court has adopted Chicago 
rather than Harvard reasoning is the indirect purchaser rule, which awards 
the full trebled overcharge to direct purchasers and no damages at all to 
indirect purchasers.  The Supreme Court's opinion in Illinois Brick largely 
                                                                                                                                           
under '2 but remanding '1 tying claim). 
24.  E.g., Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies, note __; Frank H. Easterbrook, 
Treble What?, 55 Antitrust L.J. 95, 101 (1986). 
25.  E.g., William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 
U.Chi.L.Rev. 652 (1983). 
26.  See Phillip E. Areeda, Comment, Antitrust Violations Without Damage 
Recoveries, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1127 (1976).  The doctrine was adopted by the 
Supreme Court in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 
(1977).  See Kovacic, Intellectual DNA, note __ at ___ (TAN 198-200) 
(describing influence of Areeda article on Supreme Court). 
Hovenkamp Dominant Firm July, 2010, Page 8 
 
followed the Landes-Posner approach.27  The Harvard approach, which is 
more consistent with both standard rules of damages measurement and the 
language of '4 of the Clayton Act, is that direct purchasing intermediaries 
should recover lost profits, while end users should recover the overcharge.28  
For direct purchasing intermediaries who pass the monopolized product on 
down the distribution chain the overcharge is not even a rough approximation 
of the injury they sustain.29  Rather, their injury comes mainly from lost 
volume.  Indeed, the indirect purchaser rule often assigns the full damage 
action to actors who are not injured by the monopoly price at all, or who 
would simply be unable to prove any injury if relegated to traditional 
principles of damages measurement. 
 
 In sum, antitrust law as produced by the courts today comes much 
closer to representing the ideas of a somewhat chastised Harvard School 
than of any traditional version of the Chicago School.  Of course, at least 
some members of the Chicago School have moved to the left just as Harvard 
                                            
27.  Illinois Brick v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).  See William Landes & Richard 
A. Posner, Should Indirect Purchasers Have Standing to Sue Under the 
Antitrust Laws?  An Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois Brick, 46 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 602 (1979); William Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of 
Passing On: A Reply to Harris and Sullivan, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1274, 1275-
1276 (1980).  The opinion cited Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Cases, Economic 
Notes, and Other Materials 147-149 (1974). 
28.  See 3 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &346k (3d ed. 
2007).  Areeda's and Turner's original position is stated at 3 Antitrust Law 
&337e, pp. 191-194 (1978).  Justice Brennan's dissent (joined by Justices 
Marshall and Blackmun) relied on Areeda.  See 431 U.S. at 761: 
 
 But if the broad language of '4 means anything, surely it must render 
the defendant liable to those within the defendant's chain of distribution. 
It would indeed be "paradoxical to deny recover to the ultimate consumer 
while permitting the middlemen a windfall recovery." 
 
(quoting Phillip E. Areeda, Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text, Cases 75 (2d ed. 
1974).  The Antitrust Modernization Commission includes among its 
recommendations one that the indirect purchaser rule be abolished and that 
state law and federal antitrust cases be consolidated for the allocation of 
damages. 
29.  See 2A Phillip E. Areeda, Herbert Hovenkamp, Roger D. Blair, & Christine 
Piette, Antitrust Law &395 (3d ed. 2007) (in press). 
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has moved to the right.30  But the question for today is whether the law 
making of '2 has moved far enough.  Perhaps this Harvard School influence 
is nothing more than a stop along the way to a much more hard core set of 
Chicago positions in which the courts conclude that practices such as 
predatory pricing, unilateral refusals-to-deal, or vertical restraints are simply 
not worth the expense of litigating them and should be dismissed summarily.  
If that is the case, then it could be said that '2 law continues to produce too 
many false positives and needs even further discipline from its high point in 
the 1940s and 1950s, when the courts condemned such things as the 
construction of bigger plants31 or a lessor's price discrimination32 as 
monopolistic. 
 
 I believe the Supreme Court and the circuit courts are generally about 
where they should be in defining '2 standards.  This statement needs to be 
qualified in two ways.  First, there are a few areas, elaborated below, where 
the decisions seem to be systematically overdeterrent or underdeterrent. 
 
 Secondly, courts continue to make errors, and they always will.  But 
an error is not necessarily a sign of something fundamentally wrong with 
antitrust doctrine.  For example, the Ninth Circuit's test in the Kodak v. Image 
Tech. case for unilateral refusals to deal, including refusal to license patents 
and copyrights, is almost certainly wrong, largely because the court either 
misread or ignored existing law.33  Likewise, the Sixth Circuit's Conwood 
decision improperly confused tort law with antitrust and improperly admitted a 
                                            
30.  E.g., see Judge Posner's position on the law of predatory pricing, discussed 
in note __.  See also Spencer Weber Waller, Book Review of The Antitrust 
Enterprise 2 (2006), 
http://www.luc.edu/law/academics/special/center/antitrust/antitrust 
_enterprise.pdf. (book review, complaining that position reflected is too close to 
the Chicago School position);  Randal C. Picker, Review of Hovenkamp, The 
Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution, 2 Competition Policy Int'l 183 
(2006) (similar). 
31.  E.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 431 (2d 
Cir.1945). 
32.  E.g., United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F.Supp. 295, 340, 
341 (D.Mass.1953), affirmed per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). 
33.  Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th 
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1094 (1998). 
Hovenkamp Dominant Firm July, 2010, Page 10 
 
damages study that should never have seen the light of day.34  And the Third 
Circuit LePage's decision condemned package discounts on a woefully 
inadequate analysis of cost-price relationships or power to exclude an 
equally efficient rival.35 
 
 But none of these decisions tells us very much about the state of '2 
law.  The Federal Circuit promptly took issue with the Ninth Circuit's Kodak 
decision and the great weight of scholarly authority rests with the Federal 
Circuit.36  Indeed, the Ninth Circuit's 1997 Kodak decision is about the only 
victory that plaintiffs can claim in the wake of the Supreme Courts 1992 
decision denying summary judgment in the same case.37  Conwood is 
probably best described as a case where the court was overwhelmed with 
the record of tortious conduct, so much that they neglected to require proof 
that the conduct made any kind of contribution at all to monopoly power and 
failed to follow Daubert standards for expert testimony with sufficient rigor.  
LePage's almost certainly overreached with respect to a practice (package 
discounts) that was poorly understood and for which more rigorous tests 
were inadequately developed.38 
 
 Power and Conduct: 
 Is there a General Theory of Monopolization? 
 
Power 
 
 The law of '2 consists of two parts, the identification of monopoly 
power and proof of unlawful exclusionary practices.  A brief word about 
power seems appropriate.  The concern for both false positives and false 
                                            
34.  Conwood Co. v. United States Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2002), 
cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1148 (2003); see Hovenkamp, Antitrust Enterprise, note 
__ at 175-180. 
35.  LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert. denied, 
542 U.S. 953 (2004). 
36.  ISO Antitrust Litigation, 203 F.3d 1322, 1325-1326 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. 
denied, 531 U.S. 1143 (2001). 
37.  Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique, 2001 
Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 257. 
38.  On this point, see Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &749 (2007 Supp.). 
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negatives also relates to improperly identified monopoly power. 
 
 Here the bleakest spot in the Rehnquist Court is undoubtedly its 1992 
Kodak decision, which permitted courts to define product markets narrowly 
for buyers who were "locked in" to aftermarket purchases by virtue of their 
previous purchase of some piece of complex durable equipment.39  But as 
noted above, Kodak has acquired very little traction in the lower courts. 
 
 On the other side, the so-called "Cellophane Fallacy" is still with us, 
and continues to produce false negatives in analysis of single-firm market 
power.40  Briefly, assessing single-firm power by observing cross-elasticity of 
demand at current market prices overlooks the fact that the firm may already 
be charging monopoly prices.  This means that conventional market 
delineation techniques may systematically understate the market power of 
dominant firms.41 
                                            
39.  Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451 (1992); see 
10 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &1740 (2d ed. 2004). 
40.  For some fairly pessimistic conclusions by a prominent economist 
temporarily employed by the Antitrust Division, see Dennis W. Carlton, Market 
Definition: Use and Abuse, ___ Competition Policy Int'l. (2007) (forthcoming). 
41.  A recent possible example is HDC Medical, Inc. v. Minntech Corp., 474 
F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 2007) (single-use and multiple-use dialyzers, which cost 
more, were in same relevant market because they performed the same function, 
at least where the plaintiff offered no evidence other than the price difference 
itself for placing them in separate markets; case can be read narrowly for 
proposition that plaintiff simply did not carry its burden of showing that the 
degree of substitutability was insufficient to hold the alleged monopolist's 
product to cost).  See also Cable Holdings of Ga. v. Home Video, Inc., 825 F.2d 
1559, 1563 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v. Syufy Enters., 712 F. Supp. 1386 
(N.D. Cal. 1989), aff'd, 903 F.2d 659, 665 & n.9 (9th Cir. 1990) (all movies: 
theatrical first- or subsequent-run, video rentals, and cable television); America 
Online, Inc. v. GreatDeals.Net, 49 F.Supp.2d 851 (E.D.Va. 1999) (suggesting 
that relevant market is not limited to advertising on e-mail, but includes the 
"World Wide Web, direct mail, billboards, television, newspapers, radio, and 
leaflets, to name a few"). 
 
 On the problem, see 2B Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Antitrust Law &539 (3d ed. 2007); Lawrence J. White, market Definition in 
Monopolization Cases: A Paradigm is Missing (2005), in Issues in Competition 
Law and Policy (Wayne D. Collins, ed., 2006) (forthcoming); Gregory J. 
Werden, Market Delineation under the Merger Guidelines: Monopoly Cases and 
Alternative Approaches, 16 Rev. Ind.Org. 211 (2000)  See also Thomas G. 
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Exclusionary Conduct: the Problematic Quest for a Single Test 
 
 The recent literature on '2 has been preoccupied to the point of 
obsession with the formulation of a single test for exclusionary conduct.  
Some have advocated a "sacrifice" test -- namely, that anticompetitive 
exclusion consists in a willingness to sacrifice short run revenues for the 
future benefits of high prices in a market from which rivals have been 
excluded.  Others have advocated a "no economic sense" test that 
condemns conduct under '2 only if the conduct makes no economic sense 
unless it is understood as a mechanism for excluding rivals in order to earn 
monopoly profits down the road.  Still others believe conduct should be 
condemned under '2 only if it is capable of excluding an equally efficient 
rival.  Yet others would condemn conduct that unreasonably raises rivals' 
costs.  Finally, some believe that no single test captures the entire range of 
practices that we might wish to condemn as unlawfully exclusionary. 
 
 "Sacrifice" and "No economic sense."  Together, the "sacrifice" and 
"no economic sense" tests for unlawful exclusionary behavior offer the 
narrowest grounds for condemning conduct as monopolistic.  Taken literally, 
they avoid balancing because any reasonable prospect of net gain to the 
monopolist that does not come from injury to competition exonerates the 
defendant.  Thus these tests avoid the definitional and measurement 
complexities that can serve to make tests based on net welfare unworkable, 
at least in close cases. 
 
 The Aspen decision condemned conduct when the defendant "was 
not motivated by efficiency concerns and ... was willing to sacrifice short-run 
benefits and consumer goodwill in exchange for a perceived long-run impact 
on its smaller rival."42  So-called "sacrifice" tests for exclusionary conduct look 
at the defendant's willingness to sacrifice short-term revenues or profits in 
exchange for larger revenues anticipated to materialize later when a 
monopoly has been created or the dominant firm's position strengthened.  
The rationale of the sacrifice test is that conduct that seems rational (profit 
maximizing or loss minimizing) without regard to the creation or preservation 
of monopoly have a fully legitimate explanation.  Since no firm should be 
regarded as a trustee for either its rivals' or consumers' welfare, such conduct 
                                                                                                                                           
Krattenmaker, Robert H. Lande, & Steven Salop, Monopoly Power and Market 
Power in Antitrust Law, 76 Geo.L.Rev. 241 (1987). 
42.  Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 610-611 
(1985). 
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cannot be condemned without running a severe risk of chilling competitive 
behavior. 
 
 The best example of such a test in the case law is the recoupment test 
for predatory pricing given in the Brooke Group case, although it appeared in 
lower court opinions and the academic literature much earlier.43  The sacrifice 
test is also useful in unilateral refusal to deal cases to the extent that, if we 
are to have law condemning refusals to deal at all, we must have a 
mechanism for identifying the very small subset of refusals that should be 
condemned.  In Trinko the government relied on a sacrifice theory in arguing 
that the alleged refusal to deal did not satisfy any Sherman Act standard of 
illegality.44 
 
 One particular problem with sacrifice tests is that most substantial 
investments involve a short term "sacrifice" of dollars in anticipation of 
increased revenue at some future point.  The automobile manufacturer who 
constructs a new plant is certainly in such a position.  It spends money on the 
plant during a lengthy period of planning and construction, hoping to realize 
                                            
43.  Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993); 
A. A. Poultry Farms v. Rose Acre Farms, 881 F.2d 1396, 1400-1401 (7th Cir. 
1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1019 (1990) (advocating recoupment test). 
 
 See also Phillip E. Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and 
Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv.L.Rev. 697, 
698 (1975): 
 
 "... the classically-feared case of predation has been the deliberate 
sacrifice of present revenues for the purpose of driving rivals out of the 
market and then recouping the losses through higher profits earned in 
the absence of competition.") (emphasis added). 
 
See also the first edition of Antitrust Law, &711b at 151 (1978) (similar); Richard 
A. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective 184 (1976) (similar). 
44.  See Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 2003 WL 21269559, at *16-17, Verizon 
Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004) 
("conduct is exclusionary where it involves a sacrifice of short-term profits or 
goodwill that makes sense only insofar as it helps the defendant maintain or 
obtain monopoly power"); and id. at *19-20 ("If such a refusal involves a 
sacrifice of profits or business advantage that makes economic sense only 
because it eliminates or lessens competition, it is exclusionary and potentially 
unlawful."). 
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higher profits several years down the road after the plant goes into 
production.  To be sure, the profitability of the new plant need not "depend 
on" harmful effects on a rival, but in a concentrated market it is certainly likely 
to have such effects.  Further, the new plant might not succeed unless rivals 
are forced to reduce their own output.  Nevertheless, building a new plant 
under such circumstances is almost always procompetitive. 
 
 Likewise, product innovations are always costly to the defendant, and 
their success may very well depend on their ability to exclude rivals from the 
market, but neither of these factors is or should be decisive in subsequent 
antitrust litigation.  All innovation is costly, and many successful innovations 
succeed only because consumers substitute away from rivals' older versions 
and toward the innovator's version.  In sum, the sacrifice test does not 
adequately distinguish anticompetitive "sacrifice" from procompetitive 
"investment." 
 
 The sacrifice test seems to work poorly in areas of '2 law unrelated to 
predatory pricing or refusal to deal.  Some exclusionary practices, such as 
exclusive dealing or tying, exclude immediately and are likely to be profitable 
to the dominant firm from the onset of the practice, so neither short term 
sacrifice nor subsequent recoupment is necessary to make the practice 
profitable.  Other practices, such as improper infringement suits, are often 
costly to the defendant in the short-run whether or not they are 
anticompetitive.  Indeed, the improper patent infringement suit is likely to be 
most costly to the dominant firm when the infringement defendant has the 
resources to defend it; and may not be particularly costly when the 
infringement defendants are nascent firms who are easily excluded from the 
market. 
 
 The "no economic sense" test, which is similar to the sacrifice test in 
some respects, would refuse to condemn exclusionary single firm conduct 
"unless it would make no economic sense for the defendant but for its 
tendency to eliminate or lessen competition."45  The "no economic sense" test 
offers a good deal of insight into the question of when aggressive actions by 
a single firm go too far, but it can lead to erroneous results unless 
complicating qualifications are added. 
                                            
45.  Brief for the United States and Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner at 15, Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of 
Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).  See Gregory Werden, The "No 
Economic Sense" Test for Exclusionary Conduct, 31 J.Corp.L. 293 (2006); A 
Douglas Melamed, Exclusive Dealing Agreements and Other Exclusionary 
Conduct -- are There Unifying Principles, 73 Antitrust L.J. 375 (2006). 
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 Not all monopolizing conduct that we might wish to condemn is 
"irrational" in the sense that the only explanation that makes it seem 
profitable is destruction or discipline of rivals.  Indeed, monopolizing conduct 
is not necessarily extremely costly to the defendant.  For example, supplying 
false information or failing to disclose important information to a government 
official or standard setting organization need not cost any more than 
supplying truthful information, but can create monopoly under appropriate 
circumstances.46  Indeed, the provision of false information may be less 
costly than provision of truthful information, for false information is easier and 
cheaper to manufacture.  Further, the provision of such information to a 
government official might be profitable (i.e., "make sense") whether it 
destroys a rival or merely if it results in increased output to the defendant.  
For example, the firm that acquires a patent by making false statements to 
the patent examiner and then brings infringement actions against rivals might 
be dominant and bent on protecting that position.47  But it might also be one 
of many firms in a product differentiated market, seeking to do no more than 
protect its sales from a close substitute. 
 
 Conduct capable of excluding equally efficient rival.  Judge Posner's 
proposed definition of exclusionary conduct would require the plaintiff to 
show: 
 
 that the defendant has monopoly power and ... that the challenged 
practice is likely in the circumstances to exclude from the defendant's 
market an equally or more efficient competitor.  The defendant can 
rebut by proving that although it is a monopolist and the challenged 
practice exclusionary, the practice is, on balance, efficient.48 
 
                                            
46.  E.g., Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 
U.S. 172 (1965) (maintaining infringement suit on patent obtained by fraud); 
Rambus, Inc., 2006 WL 2330117 (FTC, Aug. 2, 2006) (allegedly providing false 
information to private standard setting organization with the result that 
organization unknowingly adopts standards protected by defendant's IP rights).  
See also Netflix, Inc. v. Blockbuster, Inc., 2006 WL 2458717 (slip copy) 
(N.D.Cal. Aug 22, 2006) (NO. C06-02361 WHA) (refusing to dismiss Walker 
Process style counterclaim against Netflix on business method patent, based on 
Netflix's alleged failure to disclose prior art in patent application). 
47.  E.g,. Walker Process, id. 
48.  Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law 194-195 (2d ed. 2001). 
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 This definition has enjoyed some recognition in the case law.  For 
example, in condemning the targeted package discounts at issue in 
LePage's, the Third Circuit observed that "even an equally efficient rival may 
find it impossible to compensate for lost discounts on products that it does 
not produce."49  The "equally efficient rival" test has also found acceptance in 
predatory pricing cases, particularly in discussions of how to identify a price 
as predatory.  The reasoning is that a firm should not be penalized for having 
lower costs than its rivals and pricing accordingly.  As a result, a price is 
predatory only if it is reasonably calculated to exclude a rival who is at least 
as efficient as the defendant.50  Judge Posner's own examples in defense of 
his definition of exclusionary conduct pertain to pricing.  He writes that it: 
 
 would be absurd to require the firm to hold a price umbrella over less 
efficient entrants.... [P]ractices that will exclude only less efficient 
firms, such as the monopolist's dropping his price nearer to (but now 
below) his cost, are not actionable, because we want to encourage 
efficiency.51 
 
Clearly we do not want low cost firms to hold their prices above their costs 
merely to suffer a rival to become established in the market. 
 
 The equally efficient rival definition of exclusionary conduct can be 
underdeterrent in situations where the rival that is most likely to emerge is 
less efficient than the dominant firm.  Consider the filing of fraudulent or 
                                            
49.  LePage's, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 155 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 542 U.S. 953 (2004). 
50.  See, e.g., Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp.,724 F.2d 227, 232 (1st 
Cir. 1983) (noting that an "avoidable" or "incremental" cost test for predatory 
pricing is irrational because it would be less costly for the defendant to halt 
production; and moreover, "equally efficient competitors cannot permanently 
match this low price and stay in business.").  See also MCI Communic. Corp. v. 
AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1113 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983) 
(similar, predatory pricing); Borden, Inc. v. FTC, 674 F.2d 498, 515 (6th Cir. 
1982), vacated on other grds., 461 U.S. 940 (1983) (same, predatory pricing); 
Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 920 F.Supp. 455, 466-
467 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("below-cost pricing, unlike pricing at or above that level, 
carries with it the threat that the party so engaged will drive equally efficient 
competitors out of business, thus setting the stage for recoupment at the 
expense of consumers"). 
51.  Posner, Antitrust Law, note __ at 196. 
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otherwise improper IP infringement claims.52  The value of infringement 
actions as entry deterrence devices is greatest when the parties have an 
unequal ability to bear litigation costs. This will typically be before or soon 
after the new entrant has begun production.  The filing of a fraudulent patent 
infringement suit, unlike setting one's price at or a little above marginal cost, 
is a socially useless practice.  But the strategy might very well not be effective 
against an equally efficient rival, who could presumably defend and win the 
infringement claim.  In this case Judge Posner's definition of exclusionary 
conduct seems unreasonably lenient and even perverse.  It exonerates the 
defendant in precisely those circumstances when the conduct is most likely to 
be unreasonably exclusionary. 
 
 Raising Rivals' Costs (RRC).  Several anticompetitive actions by 
dominant firms are best explained as efforts to deny rivals market access by 
increasing their costs.  Such strategies may succeed in situations where 
more aggressive ones involving the complete destruction of rivals might not.  
Once rivals' costs have been increased the dominant firm can raise its own 
price or increase its market share at their expense.53 
                                            
52.  See 3 Antitrust Law &706 (2d ed. 2002). 
53.  See Thomas Krattenmaker & Steven Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: 
Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 Yale L.J. 209 (1986); 
Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals' Costs, 73 Am.Econ.Rev. 
267 (1983).  See also Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review 
and Critique, 2001 Col. Bus. L. Rev. 257. 
 
 A particularly interventionist RRC test is proposed in Einer Elhauge, 
Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 253 (2003), which 
queries "whether the alleged exclusionary conduct succeeds in furthering 
monopoly power (1) only if the monopolist has improved its own efficiency or (2) 
by impairing rival efficiency whether or not it enhances monopolist efficiency." 
The second part of this test would condemn a firm for using practices that 
lowered its own costs if, in the process, they denied scale economies to a rival.  
See, e.g., Elhauge, id. 324 (arguing that even if economies of scale are very 
substantial, above a 50% market share, the firm cannot use exclusive contracts 
to increase its output into a lower cost range but must simply set its price).  The 
Elhauge test would also condemn a firm who used a practice that increased its 
sales beyond the point that its scale economies topped out, if in so doing it 
denied scale economies to a rival.  See id. at 324 (illustration of firm whose tie, 
exclusive deal, or other agreement requires customers to purchase 70% of the 
market from it, even though its economies of scale top out at 40%).  Even 
assuming such tests were desirable, they seem to make unrealistic demands on 
tribunals to measure relevant scale economies.  See 2B Antitrust Law &408 (3d 
ed. 2007). 
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 The real value of RRC theories is not to create a new set of unlawful 
exclusionary practices, but rather to show that certain practices that have 
traditionally been subjected to antitrust scrutiny can be anticompetitive even 
though they do not literally involve the destruction of rivals.  Situations in 
which rivals stay in the market but their costs increase may be more likely to 
occur and exist in a wider variety than those in which rivals are destroyed.  
Further, cost raising strategies might be less detectable and less likely to 
invite prosecution.  Indeed, a strategy of raising rivals' costs need not injure a 
rival severely at all if the dominant firm increases its own prices to permit 
smaller firms a price hike that compensates them for their cost increase.  As a 
result, RRC operates as a kind of substitute for the older antitrust theories of 
anticompetitive exclusion that required the complete foreclosure or 
destruction of rivals, and accordingly provoked competitive responses.  Many 
cases brought under both ''1 and 2 of the Sherman Act have acknowledged 
the theory.54 
 
 Of course, the law has never required complete market exclusion as a 
                                            
54.  E.g., Microsoft, note __, 253 F.3d at 70 (defendant's exclusionary contracts 
relegated rival Netscape to higher cost distribution channels); United States v. 
Dentsply Int'l., Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 191 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 
1023 (2006) (similar; defendant's exclusive dealing arrangements relegated 
rivals to inferior distribution alternatives); JTC Petroleum Co. v. Piasa Motor 
Fuels, Inc., 190 F.3d 775, 778-779 (7th Cir.1999) (members of cartel may have 
paid off suppliers to charge cartel rivals significantly higher prices, thus creating 
a price umbrella under which the cartel could operate); Brand Name Prescription 
Drugs Antitrust Litigation, 123 F.3d 599, 614 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 
U.S. 1123 (1998) (similar); Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1478 (9th 
Cir. 1997), aff'd on nonantitrust grounds, 525 U.S. 299 (1999) (health care 
provider's policy of shifting indigent patients to rivals could have effect of raising 
their costs); Multistate Legal Studies, Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal 
and Professional Publications, Inc., 63 F.3d 1540, 1553 (10th Cir.1995) 
(dominant firm's practice of scheduling its own full slate of classes so as to 
conflict with rivals' specialized classes could have had effect of raising the rival's 
cost of distributing its own product); Premier Elec. Const. Co. v. National Elec. 
Contractors Ass'n, Inc., 814 F.2d 358 (7th 1987) (alleged agreement between 
union and contractors' association under which union would obtain fee from all 
employers without whom it had collective bargaining agreements, whether or not 
they were association members, to be paid to the association, probably 
intended to raise the costs of non-member contractors).  Cf. Ball Memorial 
Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1340 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(rejecting RRC claim that Blue Cross forced hospitals to submit lower bids for 
taking care of BC patients, with result that it had to impose higher charges on 
non-BC patients). 
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prerequisite to suit.  Indeed, some successful '2 plaintiffs have both grown 
their market shares and earned high profits even through the period that the 
exclusionary practices were occurring.55 
 
 In sum, RRC is a useful but also incomplete definition of exclusionary 
practices.  Further, many practices that raise rivals' cost, such as innovation 
that either deprives rivals or revenue or forces them to innovate in return, are 
also welfare enhancing.  As a result, "raising rivals' costs" can never operate 
as a complete test for exclusionary conduct.56  One must always add an 
adverb such as "unreasonably," but that invariably requires some kind of 
balancing or trade off. 
 
 No Single Test.  Each of the previously discussed tests is useful for 
assessing some types of exclusionary conduct but much less so for others.  
Given the current state of the law my own preference is the "test" proposed in 
the Antitrust Law Treatise that monopolistic conduct consists of acts that: 
 
 (1) are reasonably capable of creating, enlarging or prolonging 
monopoly power by impairing the opportunities of rivals; and 
 
 (2) that either (2a) do not benefit consumers at all, or (2b) are 
unnecessary for the particular consumer benefits that the acts 
produce, or (2c) produce harms disproportionate to the resulting 
benefits.57 
 
 To this should be added that the practice must be reasonably 
susceptible to judicial control, which means that the court must be able to 
identify the conduct as anticompetitive and either fashion a penalty producing 
the correct amount of deterrence or an equitable remedy likely to improve 
competition.  This concern is driven by a proposition that is central to both the 
Chicago and Harvard positions: administrability is key.  More complex rules 
                                            
55.  E.g., Conwood Co. v. United States Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 784 (6th 
Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1148 (2003).  The plaintiff claimed that its 
market share would have grown even faster and that it would have earned even 
more profits but for the exclusionary conduct. 
56.  This is apparently the source of Judge Posner's objection.  See Posner, 
Antitrust Law note __ at 196, referring to RRC as "not a happy formula" 
because one way of raising rivals; costs is to be more efficient than the rival, 
thus denying it scale economies. 
57.  See 3 Antitrust Law &651 (2d ed. 2002). 
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are not helpful if they cannot be effectively applied. 
 
 This formulation given above is not so much a test as a series of 
premises.  Clause (1) of the test ensures that the conduct is both 
exclusionary and "substantial," in the sense that it is reasonably capable of 
creating or prolonging monopoly.  Clause (2a) deals with the easiest case for 
identifying anticompetitive exclusion; namely where no consumer benefit 
whatsoever can be shown.  Clause (2b) deals with situations where a less 
restrictive alternative might produce equivalent benefits, and (2c) deals with 
the small number of situations thought to require some kind of balancing of 
harms and gains.  Beyond this formulation, courts must still develop specific 
tests for specific types of conduct, such as the recoupment/price-cost test for 
predatory pricing, or the "no economic sense" test for unilateral refusals to 
deal. 
 
 Problem Areas 
 
 Monopolization law's conceptual and administrative problems will 
probably never be solved, given the open-ended nature of '2's 
"monopolizing" language.  A few problem areas seem worth noting. 
 
 One area of widespread agreement is that misuse of government 
process can create monopolies.  Patent and other IP exclusions have been 
particularly problematic and arguably have produced a fair amount of 
underdeterrence.  For example, ever since the Supreme Court's Walker 
Process decision in 1965 the use of improper or overly broad patent claims to 
maintain or create monopoly has been a significant source of antitrust 
litigation.58  Walker Process itself spoke very generally of infringement 
actions based on patents that were obtained by "fraud."  Today the law has 
become much more technical and stylized.  Many claims continue to involve 
enforcement actions based on patents that were acquired by inequitable 
conduct before the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).  Not every instance 
of inequitable conduct renders a patent unenforceable.  Federal Circuit law 
on the question considers enforceability by addressing two issues.  One is 
the nature of the misconduct and the intent behind it; the other is "materiality," 
or the likelihood that the patent examiner would have disapproved the patent 
(or a patent claim) had the misconduct not occurred.  In general, the more 
aggressive the misconduct the smaller the showing of materiality need be to 
make a patent unenforceable, and vice versa. 
                                            
58.  Walker Process Equipment v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 
172 (1965).  See 3 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &706 
(2d ed. 2002). 
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 Another set of cases involve IP rights where there is not necessarily a 
claim of misconduct in the acquisition of the right, but rather where the 
infringement action itself was improperly brought.  In a patent case this could 
be because the patentee had good reason to know that the infringement 
defendant's technology was not infringing (not covered by a particular patent 
claim) or that it had a valid license; or where the patent was unenforceable 
for some other post-application reason.59  The Supreme Court addressed 
one variation of this issue in its Professional Real Estate case where the IP 
claim was under the copyright laws rather than a patent, and the infringement 
defendant's claim was that the plaintiff had filed its action based on an 
improper interpretation of a question of law.60 
 
 Walker Process actions in the Federal Circuit have been frustrated by 
that court's reluctance to adopt a more objective test for the type of 
inequitable conduct needed to trigger Walker Process liability.  For example, 
in the Dippin' Dots case the infringement plaintiff's patent was rendered 
unenforceable by some 800 retail sales that occurred more than a year 
before the initial patent application was filed.61  The Patent Act's on sale bar 
prevents patenting of a product that was sold more than a year prior to the 
filing of the initial patent application.62  In this case the patentee neglected to 
disclose this information in its application, and the patentee's declaration 
contained a sworn statement that no such sales had occurred.  Further, the 
information, if disclosed, would certainly have barred patentability. 
                                            
59.  E.g., United States v. Besser Mfg. Co., 96 F.Supp. 304, 312 (E.D.Mich. 
1951), aff'd 343 U.S. 444 (1952) (infringement action where patentee had no 
basis for believing that defendant's technology infringed the patent); Moore 
USA, Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 139 F. Supp. 2d 348 W.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(refusing to dismiss Sherman '2 counterclaim allegation that patentee filed 
infringement claim while knowing that counterclaimant's product did not infringe 
because it did not incorporate an essential ingredient); International 
Technologies Consultants v. Pilkington PLC, 137 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(infringement suit based on expired patents a possible antitrust violation). 
60.  Professional Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49 
(1993) (purely legal question whether charging money to play a movie video in a 
hotel room constituted a "performance," and thus an infringement of the 
copyright, where Circuit Courts had split on the issue; no antitrust violation). 
61.  Dippin'Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
62.  35 U.S.C. ' 102(b). 
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 However, the court also held that the degree of inequitable conduct 
necessary to invalidate the patent was not as great as the degree needed to 
support an antitrust claim.  In this case the only evidence of the patentee's 
anticompetitive intent was the fact that it had made the 800 sales over a one 
week period and then later swore to the PTO that the sales had not occurred. 
 Of course, it subsequently also filed a patent infringement suit against those 
offending one or more of the claims made in the patent.  The Federal Circuit 
held that while this omission clearly qualified as inequitable conduct, it fell 
short of fraud in the Walker Process sense, which requires a stronger 
showing of both intent and materiality.63  In order to support a Walker 
Process antitrust case "there must be evidence of intent separable from the 
simple fact of the omission."64  The court observed: 
 
 It might be argued that because the omitted reference was so 
important to patentability, DDI [the patentee] must have known of its 
importance and must have made a conscious decision not to disclose 
it. That argument has some force, but to take it too far would be to 
allow the high materiality of the omission to be balanced against a 
lesser showing of deceptive intent by the patentee. Weighing intent 
and materiality together is appropriate when assessing whether the 
patentee's prosecution conduct was inequitable. However, when 
Walker Process claimants wield that conduct as a "sword" to obtain 
antitrust damages rather than as a mere "shield" against enforcement 
of the patent, they must prove deceptive intent independently.65 
                                            
63.  Id. at __, relying on Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 
1059, 1068-1069 (Fed.Cir.1998). 
64.  Id. at __ ("The difference in breadth between inequitable conduct and 
Walker Process fraud admits the possibility of a close case whose facts reach 
the level of inequitable conduct, but not of fraud before the PTO. This is such a 
case."). 
65.  Id. at ___ (internal citations omitted).  The Federal Circuit was following 
dicta from the Supreme Court suggesting that an inquiry into actual subjective 
intent is necessary.  See Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia 
Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60 (1993): 
 
 Only if challenged litigation is objectively meritless may a court examine 
the litigant's subjective motivation.  Under this second part of our 
definition of sham, the court should focus on whether the baseless 
lawsuit conceals "an attempt to interfere directly with the business 
relationships of a competitor.... (citations omitted). 
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 This approach re-creates some of the same horrors of pre-Matsushita 
antitrust litigation under standards reluctant to grant summary judgment, 
except in reverse.  It requires a discovery trip through the patentee's 
documents for evidence of anticompetitive "intent" other than that manifested 
in the patent application itself.  Further, it makes the infringement defendant's 
antitrust counterclaim dependent on the vagaries of the patentee's document 
retention policy or other efforts to suppress incriminating information, often 
attending pre-application activities that occurred many years prior to the 
litigation.  For example, in Dippin Dots the sales found to invalidate the patent 
occurred in 1987.  The subsequent patent infringement suit was filed in April 
of 2000, some thirteen years later.66 
 
 Another problem area is the law of strategic pricing, including various 
sorts of discounting policies.  Both the "recoupment" test and the AVC test for 
predatory pricing are imperfect and underdeterrent.  The "recoupment" test 
as developed in Brooke Group denigrated the value of disciplinary actions 
within oligopoly.  The degree of competitiveness in concentrated industries 
varies widely and in some the value of disciplinary pricing can be quite high 
to market leaders and harmful to consumers.  Cigarettes, with a long history 
of lock-step pricing, is very likely such an industry. 
 
 The AVC test basically identifies short-run marginal cost as the proper 
baseline for measuring predation, and the Areeda-Turner variation 
recognizes prices above average variable cost as a virtual safe harbor for 
predation claims.  It is generally acknowledged that the AVC test can be 
underdeterrent, particularly in circumstances where fixed costs are high, 
which is most often the case in markets that are structurally susceptible to 
monopolization.67 
 
 Discounting practices have been particularly problematic in recent 
years.  The law seems to be in roughly the same position that the law of 
predatory pricing was in the seventies and eighties.  The early formulations 
focused heavily on intent, and cost tests played a secondary role, to the point 
that some decisions were willing to condemn predation on prices above any 
measure of cost. 
 
 Single-product and "aggregated" multi-product discounts can pose 
                                            
66.  See In re Dippin' Dots Patent Litigation, 249 F.Supp.2d 1346 
(N.D.Ga.,2003) (docket entry). 
67.  See 3 Antitrust Law note __ at &&735-737. 
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different issues.68  Some single-product discount challenges have been to so-
called "market share" discounts, which reward purchasers for purchasing a 
specified percentage of their needs from the defendant.  These discounts 
differ from and are less harmful to competition than exclusive dealing in 
several respects.  First, because the specified percentage is less than 100%, 
they foreclose less than exclusive dealing imposed by a seller with the same 
market share.  Second, and most significantly, the penalty for falling below 
the minimum percentage is loss of the discount, which means that the buyer 
can evade the contract at any time simply by paying the seller the higher 
price.  Third, and most significantly, an equally efficient firm can match a fully 
discounted price that is above the defendant's costs.69 
 
 The most common argument for condemning above cost market share 
discounts is that they may serve to raise rivals' costs by depriving them of 
sufficient sales to attain economies of scale equivalent to those enjoyed by 
the defendant.  Here, the same set of considerations would appear to apply 
as the courts have applied in predatory pricing cases such as Brooke Group. 
 First, one might be able to envision circumstances in which above cost 
single-product discounts can be used to reduce rivals' scale economies, and 
welfare might be reduced in the process.  But second, one doubts that the 
courts can administer '2 claims under such a theory without creating an 
intolerable risk of chilling procompetitive behavior, a result that could be far 
more socially costly.70  Manifestly, the law of predatory pricing does not rest 
                                            
68.  This discussion largely ignores defenses, which are significant and almost 
certainly explain the great majority of situations in which discounting occurs.  
See  11 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &&1810-1814 (2d ed. 2005). 
69.  See, e.g., Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039 (8th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 979 (2000) (refusing to condemn above cost market 
share discounts by dominant firm because equally efficient rival could steal the 
sales at any time). 
70.  See Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 223: 
 
 As a general rule, the exclusionary effect of prices above a relevant 
measure of cost either reflects the lower cost structure of the alleged 
predator, and so represents competition on the merits, or is beyond the 
practical ability of a judicial tribunal to control without courting intolerable 
risks of chilling legitimate price-cutting....  "To hold that the antitrust laws 
protect competitors from the loss of profits due to such price competition 
would, in effect, render illegal any decision by a firm to cut prices in order 
to increase market share.  The antitrust laws require no such perverse 
result." 
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on the premise that anticompetitive, above cost pricing strategies are 
implausible.  In fact, such theories are quite numerous and varied.71  Rather, 
the law rests on the observation that Article III courts and, in particular, juries 
are not able to distinguish such strategies with sufficient clarity to avoid 
condemning procompetitive behavior. 
 
 The situation of aggregated multi-product discounts is even more 
complex because an equally efficient firm making only one product or a 
subset of products in a bundle may not be able to match an aggregated 
discount.  Assume that the defendant is the only firm in the market making 
products A and B.  Rivals make one but not the other.  If the defendant ties a 
discount to combined purchases of A and B an equally efficient rival making 
only B might be able to match the discounted B price, but not the foregone 
discount on A that results from the buyers' failure to take the requisite amount 
of both A and B. 
 
 Whether such discounting practices should be condemned at above 
cost prices and, if so, when raises a number of interesting questions that 
have been explored quite thoroughly in the literature although less so in the 
case law.  First, if at least one significant rival also makes both A and B then 
the strategy should not be condemned simply because the plaintiff, who 
makes only one of the products, cannot match the discount.  Second, the 
discount will not exclude an equally efficient single product rival unless when 
the full discount is attributed to the product upon which exclusion is claimed 
the price of that product falls below cost.  Or to state this differently: one 
needs to ask whether the incremental price of the two products when they are 
bundled is enough to cover the incremental cost of producing the bundle.   
Both the Harvard and Chicago School positions currently require a cost-
based test, which can provide both relative administrative simplicity and 
avoid the kind of overdeterrence that is certain to result from non-cost-based 
tests that invariably look at the defendant’s intent.  As the Ninth Circuit noted 
in its Cascade Health decision, the attribution test is something of a 
compromise, requiring less than a showing that the entire package is priced 
at below cost, but more than impossible-to-administer formulations that avoid 
costs altogether or require farirly precise measurement of such things as 
                                                                                                                                           
quoting Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 116 (1986). 
71.  For examples, see Jean Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization 367-
374 (1992); Frederic M. Scherer & David Ross, Industrial Market Structure and 
Economic Performance 356-366, 405-406 (3d ed. 1990); Joe S. Bain, Industrial 
Organization 269-76 (2d ed. 1968). 
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economies of scale, which has always eluded fact finders. 72 
 
 Third, even bundling that does not satisfy this incremental cost test is 
usually procompetitive; indeed, it may be an important avenue by which 
oligopolies are destabilized.  For example, the truck dealer in a concentrated 
market may be reluctant to cut the nominal price for fear of retaliation; 
however, it may throw in an air conditioner which costs $1000 for an 
incremental price of $300.  A firm that sells only truck air conditioners but not 
the trucks themselves may be excluded by such a practice, but if the price of 
the truck-plus-air-conditioner exceeds its costs it is hard to justify a rule that 
protects the air conditioner firm by limiting competition in the truck market. 
 
 Finally, a very brief note on remedies.  The efficacy of '2 law depends 
on the success of remedies in making the market more competitive.  
Decades of aggressiveness in use of structural remedies73 has given way to 
a preference for conduct remedies.  Which remedy has the comparative 
advantage depends on the circumstances.  In a case such as Dentsply, 
where the defendant preserved its dominant position by means of a set of 
exclusive dealing practices, an injunction against the variants of such 
practices may be all that is needed.  But too often nonstructural remedies 
amount to little more than price regulation, which rarely satisfies the goals of 
antitrust.74  By contrast, in a case such as Microsoft where the behavior is 
                                            
72.  See Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, ___ F.3d ___, 2007 WL 
2473229 (9th Cir. Sep. 4, 2007).  The Ninth Circuit relied on the Antitrust Law 
treatise (Supp., Paragraph 749) in adopting a version of this test.  It rejected 
tests that would condemn prices that were above any measure of cost, such as 
the Third Circuit’s LePage’s test; but it also rejected tests that would require a 
showing that the price of the entire bundle was below a measure of the 
defendant’s costs.   
73.  E.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (ordering 
dissolution of Standard Oil into 34 companies).  See also United States v. 
United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per 
curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); and the eventual dissolution decree in 391 U.S. 
244 (1968).  These decisions as well as some others are discussed in William 
E. Kovacic, Designing Antitrust Remedies for Dominant Firm Misconduct, 31 
Conn.L.Rev. 1285 (1999). 
74.  E.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, 125 F.3d 1195 (9th 
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1094 (1998).  Cf. In re Rambus, Inc., #9302, 
2007 WL 431524  (FTC, Feb. 5, 2007) (ordering licensing at specified RAND 
royalty). 
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multi-faceted and the defendant has repeatedly been condemned75 a 
carefully tailored structural remedy is probably necessary, including but 
perhaps not limited to forced sharing of IP rights.  The time seems ripe to 
become more aggressive about structural remedies once again, particularly 
for repeat offenders. 
                                            
75.  United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 66-67 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. 
denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001) (condemning Microsoft's numerous practices 
directed mainly at Netscape and Sun Microsystems); Proposed Final Judgment 
and Competitive Impact Statement; United States of America v. Microsoft Corp., 
59 Fed. Reg. 42,845 (Dep't Justice Aug. 19, 1994) (consent decree in earlier 
litigation challenging "per processor" licensing practice directed mainly at IBM's 
OS/2 operating system); and see United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448 
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (upholding decree). 
